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The Scienter Standard of Liability Under
the Proposed Federal Securities Code
FREDRIC J. KLINK*
I. Introduction
In discussing scienter, I will rely principally on Professor
Loss's discussion in the Comments to the Proposed Federal Se-
curities Code' and on relevant case law, principally the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.'
I will first outline the general fraud and civil liability
scheme of the Code and discuss some of the Code's definitions
which bear on the issue of scienter. Next, I will trace the evolu-
tion of the scienter concept in the various drafts of the Code and
then compare the Code's treatment with present law.
II. The Fraud and Civil Liability Scheme of the Code
Fraud and civil liability are dealt with in Parts XVI and
XVII of the Code.' In his introduction to the Code, Professor
Loss states that these parts of the Code are of the broadest pub-
lic interest. The Code provisions, however, can only be assessed
* LL.B., 1960, Columbia Law School; A.B., 1955, Columbia University;, Member,
Schreiber, Klink, Schreiber, Lenhardt & Carney, P.C., New York.
1. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1978) (Proposed Official Draft). References in this speech
are to the 1978 draft. Comparison will be made with the ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1980)
(Official Draft) where the changes in the 1980 draft are significant. On Sept. 30, 1980, the
Securities and Exchange Commission published, in an agency release, changes to the
1980 draft which were agreed upon by Professor Loss and the Commission. SEC Sec. Act
Release No. 33-6242, 20 SEC Docket 1483 (1980) [hereinafter referred to and cited as
CODE RECOMMENDATION].
2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Petitioner, an accounting firm,
was found not liable under rule lOb-5 for failing to discover an unusual procedure estab-
lished by a brokerage firm's president, who had induced respondents to invest in nonex-
istent escrow accounts. The Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for dam-
ages will not lie under § 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 in the absence
of any allegation of scienter, i.e. "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193,
194 n. 12. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
3. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1601-1614, 1701-1728 (1978).
1
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in the light of the difficulties encountered under current law. In
Professor Loss's view, these difficulties are due, in part, to the
sparseness of present legislation and to the fact that this area of
the law has been frequently litigated and, as a result, is mostly
judge-made."
A. Definitions in the Code
"Fraudulent acts" and "misrepresentations" are defined in
Part XVI, sections 262 and 297.' A fraudulent act, as defined,
includes an "act, device, scheme, practice, or course of conduct
that (1) is fraudulent or (2) operates or would operate as a
fraud." 6 This includes inaction or silence when there is a duty to
act or speak. A person must, however, act with knowledge that
his action will result in fraud, or in reckless disregard of such a
possibility, if his act is to be considered fraudulent under the
Code.7
"Misrepresentation" is defined as "(1) an untrue statement
of a material fact, or (2) an omission to state a material fact
necessary to prevent the statements made from being misleading
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made."
If, however, a statement of fact has a reasonable basis and is
made in good faith, it is not a misrepresentation. 9
Section 262(a), which contains the definition of fraud, is de-
rived from the language of rule 10b-5 which, in turn, is derived
4. ALI FED. SEC. CODE at xlix (1978).
Professor Loss lists the most serious difficulties under current law as follows: (a)
currently, the fraud provisions are scattered in several statutes and overlap; (b) the in-
creased reliance on rule 10b-5 and the resultant decreased use of §§ 9(e) and 18 of the
1934 Act and § 12(2) of the 1933 Act have led to difficult questions with respect to
express and implied liabilities for wrongful acts in connection with all securities transac-
tions; (c) the growth of a "federal corporation law" has created problems; (d) the 1934
Act's provision on insider's short-term trading profits, § 16(b), has presented difficult
questions; (e) the judicial practice of developing civil liability for rule violations of stock
exchange rules has created uncertainties; and (f) the scattered statutes presently relied
upon are often internally inconsistent. ALI FED. SEC. CODE at xlix - lii (1978).
5. Id. §§ 262, 297. The 1980 draft makes no change in § 297 but adds a cross refer-
ence to § 1602(b)(2) which contains a duty to correct. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 297 (1980).
6. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 262(a) (1978).
7. Id. §§ 262(b), 262(c).
8. Id. § 297(a).
9. Id. § 297(b).
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from section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.10 These definitions,
together with the definitions of "fact" 1 and "material," 12 make
it possible, according to Professor Loss, to consolidate the pro-
scription of fraudulent acts with respect to securities into one
10. For the text of section 262(a), see text accompanying note 6 supra. Rule 10b-5
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976).
11. The 1978 draft broadly defines "fact" as "(a) a promise, prediction, estimate,
projection, or forecast, or (b) a statement of intention, motive, opinion, or law." ALI FED.
SEC. CODE § 256 (1978).
12. "A fact is 'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person
would consider it important under the circumstances in determining his course of ac-
tion," ALI FED. Ssc. CODE § 293(a) (1978). This definition incorporates the "substantial
likelihood" phrase from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). This
case involved an action brought by Northway, a TSC shareholder, against Aetna Na-
tional claiming that the ATSC-Aetna National joint proxy statement was incomplete and
materially misleading in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. Northway also alleged that Aetna National pursued a fraudu-
lent plan to acquire TSC in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and rule 10b-5. The court held that
[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . .It does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would
have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote .. . [T]here must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made available.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
1981]
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short section, section 1602. Section 1602 makes it unlawful for
anyone to make a misrepresentation or to commit a fraudulent
act with respect to purchases, sales, tender offers and invest-
ment advice.13
B. The Code's Liability Provisions
Part XVII of the Code, which contains the sections dealing
with liability, includes all of today's express civil liabilities and,
in addition, expressly includes those liabilities presently most
often implied. Furthermore, section 1722 of the Code authorizes
the courts to imply private causes of actions if, among other
things, such actions are consistent with the conditions and re-
strictions applicable to the private causes of action expressly
provided in the Code and if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
remedy sought is not disproportionate to the violation.
14
III. Scienter
A. Evolution of the Definition of Scienter in the Proposed
Code
The comments accompanying section 287 of the Code trace
the evolution of the knowledge and the scienter concepts in the
various drafts of the Code. Originally the Code defined the term
13. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1602(a) (1978). This section provides:
(a) [General.] It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to
make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security,
an offer to sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2)
a proxy solicitation or other circularization of security holders in respect of a se-
curity of a registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in
favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) activity or proposed activity as an
investment adviser.
The 1980 draft rephrases § 1602(a)(4) as follows: "any activity or proposed activity by an
investment adviser with respect to a client or a prospective client." ALI FED. SEC. CODE §
1602(a)(4) (1980). For the Code's definition of misrepresentation, see note 8 and accom-
panying text supra.
14. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a) (1978). Judicial implication of a private right of
action was dealt with by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In this
case, the Court formulated a four part test for implying a private right of action in fed-
eral legislation. Id. at 78. The implied liability provisions of section 1722(a) were modi-
fied by the Commission and Professor Loss to conform to the standards for implying a
private right of action set forth in Cort. CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1500-
01. See 571 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (1980).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/7
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"knowledge,"15 but did not define "scienter." Subsequently, a
definition of scienter was added to the Code and the definition
of knowledge restricted to one specific provision. In the next
draft of the Code, the definition of scienter was refined, follow-
ing the concept of the ALI Model Penal Code,1 6 in terms of "in-
tentionally" and the term knowledge was included as part of the
term scienter.1 7
Currently, scienter is defined in section 299.50 of the Code
as follows:
A person makes . . . a misrepresentation with "scienter" if he
knows that he is making a misrepresentation (or a misrepresenta-
tion is being made) or acts in reckless disregard of whether that is
80.
18
Knowledge, however, is not defined in the Code. Under the pre-
sent scheme of the Code, with no definition of knowledge, courts
and the Commission are directed to interpret the term in con-
text.19 Scienter is defined in terms of "reckless disregard" rather
than in terms of the "intent to deceive" language of the Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder case.' 0 This approach was adopted because
15. The 1978 draft originally adopted a definition of knowledge that was similar to
the definition found in RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 526 (1976). Section 526 of the Restate-
ment provides:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he
states or implies or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states
or implies.
16. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) 1980. This section provides:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practi-
cally certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
17. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 287, Comments (2) - (8) (1978).
18. Id. § 299.50.
19. Id. § 287, Comment 7(d)(i).
20. Id. § 299.50. The Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976),
defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
The Court also recognized that recklessness is considered intentional conduct for some
areas of law and thus refused to address whether "reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) or rule 10b-5." Id. at 194 n. 12.
5
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Professor Loss believes that knowledge should only mean actual
knowledge in the ordinary sense and that use of the Latinism,
"scienter," makes it clear that the Code intends something other
than ordinary knowledge."1 Scienter, then, is defined in terms of
whether the person knows that he is making a misrepresentation
or acts in reckless disregard of the accuracy of his statement."
Scienter in the proposed Code is confined to civil and Securities
and Exchange Commission administrative proceedings.'"
B. Comparison of the Code with Present Law.
Professor Loss has indicated that the Code's definition of
scienter is different from the Hochfelder test of "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."'24 Profes-
sor Loss indicates that he has always felt that clause B of rule
10b-5 does not carry out the statutory mandate of section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act unless scienter is implied.' 5 He claims, however,
that there is no reason to believe that section 10(b) of the Act
requires a measure of scienter stricter than that required by
common-law deceit.' 6
After Hochfelder, a number of circuit courts have defined
rule 10b-5 intentional behavior to include reckless disregard as
21. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 287, Comment 7 (1978). But, according to Black's Law
Dictionary, "scienter" is the Latin equivalent for "knowingly."
The term is used in pleading to signify an allegation (or that part of the declara-
tion or indictment which contains it) setting out the defendant's previous knowl-
edge of the cause which led to the injury complained of, or rather his previous
knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard against, and his omis-
sion to do which has led to the injury complained of. The term is frequently used
to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979).
22. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.50 (1978).
23. Id. § 287, Comment 7(d)(iii).
24. Id. § 287, Comment 8(a).
25. Id. § 287, Comment 8(b).
26. The comment further states that common law deceit does not require intent to
cause injury but only to induce action in reliance on the misrepresentation. "[I1ntent to
cause harm is of no importance at common law except with respect to the issue of puni-
tive damages. . . . "ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 287, Comment (8)(b) (1978). See also Arthur
Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). The
court held that proof of intention to deceive, manipulate or defraud is sufficient to show
a rule lOb-5 violation; intention to act in knowing violation of the law is not necessary.
Id. at 180-81. The common-law background of deceit, as used in Hochfelder, is discussed
in Aimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW 147 (1976).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/7
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to falsity and have attempted to give meaning to the term reck-
less. In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,' T the seventh
circuit stated that reckless behavior is actionable under rule
10b-5 for acts of commission or omission, which are "highly un-
reasonable" and reflect "an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care."28 The seventh circuit held in a subse-
quent case that reckless behavior should not be so liberally
construed as to blur the distinction between scienter and negli-
gence.2 9 The second circuit, in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., stated that reckless behavior meant highly unreasonable be-
havior or extreme departure from ordinary care.8
This seems to me to bring us back to something equivalent
to gross negligence. Mere negligence would not be actionable
under the Code and is not now actionable under rule 10b-5. 1
Reckless behavior - whatever that will be found to mean -
would clearly be actionable under the Code and is actionable
under the circuit court cases discussed above. Whether the Su-
preme Court will ultimately adopt the standard of recklessness
articulated by the circuit courts is open to question. Reckless-
ness would seem to be a much more liberal concept than the
"intent to deceive" test of Hochfelder8 2 Whether the Code's
definition of scienter, which included reckless disregard, would
prove more liberal than the Supreme Court's test will ultimately
27. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977).
28. Id. at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719,
725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
29. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). The defendant,
underwriter of short-term notes on which the issuer defaulted, was, at first, held liable
under rule 10b-5 for failing to make reasonable inquiries that would have led to the
discovery of the issuer's fraud. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Hochfelder. The Seventh Circuit, on remand, re-
versed, finding the record void of intent to deceive, since the defendant had relied upon
financial statements prepared by certified public accountants. Though the court noted
that reckless behavior can constitute scienter for rule 10b-5 purposes, it warned that
"the definition of 'reckless behavior' should not be a liberal one, lest any discernible
distinction between 'scienter' and 'negligence' be obliterated .... Id. at 793.
30. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978).
31. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). But see Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680 (1980). In Aaron the Court held that the Commission, in an injunctive action
brought for violations of 10b-5, must also show scienter.
32. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See notes 2 & 20 supra.
1981]
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depend on whether the Supreme Court will extend the
Hochfelder standard to include reckless behavior. Even if the
Supreme Court does find reckless behavior sufficient to trigger
rule 10b-5 liability, the issue will not be settled. A line will still
have to be drawn between reckless behavior and negligent be-
havior. Subsequent courts will have to draw this line.
C. Aider and Abettor Liability
It is difficult to focus on a particular provision of the Code
without discussing collateral issues. For example, in discussing
the role or position of accountants, most of the case law under
rule 10b-5, including the Hochfelder case, has involved so-called
aider and abettor liability.8 This is covered in section 1724 of
the Code which provides:
An agent or other person who knowingly causes or gives substan-
tial assistance to conduct by another person (herein a "princi-
pal") giving rise to liability under this Code (as defined in section
225 and except for section 1714) with knowledge that the conduct
is unlawful or a breach of duty, or involves a fraudulent act, a
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of a fact of special signifi-
cance by an insider (as defined in section 1603(b)), is liable as a
principal."
In the notes to this section, Professor Loss indicates that
one who "knowingly" gives substantial assistance to the person
primarily liable is himself liable. 5 The problem again is that the
term knowingly is not defined in the Code. As indicated above,
33. See, e.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478
(2d Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Hirsch v.
duPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Murphy v. McDonnell & Co., 553 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.
1977); Verace v. New York Stock Exch., 478 F. Supp. 1061 .(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
34. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(a) (1978). The 1980 Code changes "conduct" to
"fraudulent or manipulative act." ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724 (1980). A major modifica-
tion of § 1603(a) insider trading resulted from negotiations between the Commission and
Professor Loss and his advisers. See 571 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (1980); CODE
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1485. Under these changes, the Commission, in any
Commission injunctive or administrative actions involving insider trading or tippees,
would only be required to demonstrate "materiality." Private actions, however, would be
governed under the Code's test of "fact of special significance." The plaintiff would have
to show that the omitted or misrepresented fact was material, with the defendant bear-
ing the burden of showing that this material fact was not of special significance. Id.
35. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(b), Comment (1978).
[Vol. 1:373
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Professor Loss has stated that when he uses the term knowledge
in the Code, he means actual knowledge. The question becomes,
actual knowledge of what? Knowledge of a violation of law is not
required; knowledge that one is breaching a duty would seem to
be sufficient. Note that there is no reference here to reckless be-
havior; apparently reckless behavior by an aider and abettor is
not sufficient to give rise to liability.
D. Status of the Defendant
The meaning of the term reckless, which has been left unde-
fined in the Code, will vary, and will depend, in Professor Loss's
view, "to some extent on the particular person's position -
whether, for example, he is a director, a securities professional,
or some species of fiduciary."" As Professor Loss seems to sug-
gest, one of the principal factors in determining whether certain
behavior would be actionable would be the status of the defen-
dant or defendants. Accountants, securities professionals, and
inside officers and directors (particularly those with operational
responsibilities in the problem area) will probably be held to a
stricter standard of responsibility than outside directors.87
It is probably also relevant, when considering what behavior
can be classed as reckless, first, to look at the practical steps a
defendant, given his role in the transaction, could have taken to
ferret out the fraud and, second, to see what the defendant
gained by the allegedly fraudulent transaction. For example, if it
is the financial statements which are alleged to be misleading, an
accounting firm which has derived substantial fees from its cli-
ent for preparing those statements should be required to demon-
strate that extraordinary due diligence has been used to ferret
out inaccuracies." A harder case is presented if the alleged
36. Id. § 287, Comment (8)(d). See generally Note, Recklessness and Rule 10b-5
Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, 48 FolDHAm L. Rzv. 817 (1979-80).
37. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of 'Recklessness' After Hochfelder and
Aaron, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 179, 203-07 (1980).
38. See generally 5 A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RuLz 10B-5 § 66.01[d] at 3-303 (1980).
But see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980). This case in-
volved a private action against an outside accounting firm brought by a shareholder
under §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The firm was held not
liable for misleading errors in the proxy statement which were due to the firm's negli-
gence in preparing the statement. The deficiencies were not caused by failure to follow
1981]
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fraudulent document is a registration statement. The law is still
evolving as to the extent of securities lawyers' responsibilities for
inaccuracies in a registration statement or other disclosure docu-
ment. Typically, when securities lawyers give opinions on a se-
curities issue, they, unlike accountants, do not specifically opine
on text portions of a registration statement other than those
that pertain to litigation and other specialized areas. It seems
fair, however, for a securities lawyer who, for substantial com-
pensation, prepares disclosure documents to have to prove that
he used reasonable due diligence in checking the accuracy of the
registration statement. At the other end of the spectrum, it
seems that an outside director or officer should not be held to
the standards just stated if he does not have direct responsibil-
ity in the area of the misstatement, realizes no special benefit
from the fraud, and has only limited practical ways of ferreting
out the fraud.3 9
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems to me that since the terms "knowl-
edge" and "reckless," which are the two principal ingredients
within the definition of scienter, are deliberately not defined in
the Code, the same case-by-case evaluation of the standards of
liability, which has occurred, and will continue to occur, under
rule 10b-5, would continue under the Code.
V. Discussion
Mr. Jacobs: I wonder if I could add two comments. Even if
we had a definition of knowledge in the Code, we would still
have to face the following issue, extremely troublesome under
present law: if you talk about actual knowledge within an inani-
mate body, what exactly do you mean? For example, if the chief
executive officer of a corporation has actual knowledge of an
event, does that mean that the corporation has actual
appropriate accounting procedures. Id. at 428-31.
39. For further analysis of the role of securities professionals in the securities mar-
ket, see Hamil, Attorney Liability in Securities Transactions, 9 COLO. LAW 516 (1980);
Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63 MINN. L. Ruv.
79 (1978); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW, §§ 7.06, 9.09
(rev. ed. 1979).
[Vol. 1:373
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knowledge? If the answer to that is yes, what if the knowledge is
that of the geologist up in Timmons, Ontario, who is not an of-
ficer, but a $10,000-a-year employee? Is his actual knowledge
imputed to the corporation?
My second comment is on a much broader scale. I think
that while scienter is one of the key issues in the entire Code,
juries and judges in their role as fact finders are going to do
what they please, without being bound by rigorous definitions.
The definition in the Code is not going to make any difference
because as long as you convince the trier of fact that this con-
duct is wrongful, it's very likely that the finder of fact is going to
find the level of conduct necessary to impose liability.
11
